Chart 1 FLOW CHART FOR HEARSAY AND CONFRONTATION

I. ADMISSIBILITY OR EXCLUSION UNDER THE RULES OF EVIDENCE
For what purpose is the proponent of the EVI offering it? Is that purpose relevant to an issue in the case?
In order for the EVI offered to help to prove or disprove the relevant fact as to which it is offered, must the factfinder rely on the truthfulness/accuracy of a fact that was asserted by the Out-of-Court Declarant?
II. THE EVIDENCE IS ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE EVIDENCE RULES! BUT DOES THE CONSITITUTION EXCLUDE IT?
A. Confrontation Clause Overview
No:
Should the trial judge exercise his or her discretion to exclude the EVI under Rule 5-403?
Is the EVI being offered (1) against a criminal accused AND (2) at a trial on the merits?
Is the EVI "testimonial hearsay?" See Chart 4. Due process requires that a verdict not be based on unreliable hearsay.
Lower appellate courts have therefore continued to apply Ohio v. Roberts, 448 US. 56 (1980) to evaluate the fact-finder's reliance on nontestimonial hearsay. Dictum in Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (U.S. 2011), supports this position.
Under Roberts, there is no error if the nontestimonial hearsay relied upon at trial either:
(1) Qualifies under a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception (probably all those listed in Title 5, except statements against penal interest, 5-804(b)(3)); or (2) Is shown to have had equivalent "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."
Is the HS Declarant present and subject to cross-exam? 
No Chart 2 IS THE EVIDENCE AN "OUT OF COURT STATEMENT" ("OCS") OF A PERSON?
A. What is a "Statement"?
1. Rule 5-801(a) defines a "statement" as " (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion."
"Statement" means an assertion of one or more facts or opinions. A statement may be either an oral assertion, a written assertion (e.g., note or document), or conduct intended as an assertion.
2. The statement is usually "verbal" (i.e., in words, no matter whether written or oral).
3.
A "statement" also may be nonverbal assertive conduct" clearly intended as a substitute for particular words (nodding head to say yes or no, pointing to a person in a line-up, raising hand to indicate affirmative answer when asked, "who would like to …?").
4."Statement does not include implied assertions from nonverbal nonassertive
conduct (e.g., walking down the street, putting a coat on, raising an umbrella, even if offered to show that the person could walk, that it was cold out, or that it was raining).
5. "Statement" may, however, include an implied assertion from an utterance in words (if the utterance is offered to prove the truth of the assertion and has no independent relevance as circumstantial, nonhearsay evidence. Relying on Garner, as well as several federal cases (including a U.S. Supreme Court decision) holding that paychecks and money orders were not factual assertions, the Court of Special Appeals held that the paycheck was a nonhearsay verbal act, relevant and offered as "merely circumstantial nonassertive crime scene evidence."
The latter part of the rationale is more intellectually appealing here, because the fact that the paycheck bore the defendant's name and was found in the vehicle linked someone with that name to the vehicle, and it was offered for that limited purpose, rather than to show that the payor owed or had paid a certain sum. If it had been offered as to the latter purpose, and that fact had been relevant, it would have been relevant as a nonhearsay "verbal act."
B. When is a Statement an "Out-of-Court" Statement?
1. Rule 5-801(c) defines an out-of-court statement ("OCS") as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing …."
2. "Out-of-court" thus means that the evidence offered today at trial is of a statement made by any person somewhere else at another time. The other place may even have been another court proceeding. 
B. TOMA Analysis
The OCS is offered for TOMA if the proponent is asking the jury to rely on something the declarant said in his/her OCS as true, accurate, correct.
The step-by-step analysis is:
1.
Who was the out-of-court declarant?
2.
What was the declarant asserting at the time he made the OCS?
3.
For what purpose, to help to prove what relevant fact, is the proponent offering the evidence at trial?
4.
How does the evidence tend to prove that fact?
Rule 5-401 relevance requires only the slightest probative value, not necessarily persuasive probative value.
5.
If the evidence offered HELPS TO PROVE the fact as to which it is offered, even if the out-of-court declarant was either insincere or inaccurate, the evidence is NOT HEARSAY.
Ask, "Even if the assertions made in the OCS were incorrect, is it still relevant that the declarant made the statement?" If the answer to this question is yes, then the evidence is nonhearsay.
(1) EVI offered (determined to include an OCS OF A PERSON)
(2) MATERIAL FACT that EVI (1) is offered to help to prove (3) Is the OCS offered for TOMA?
The evidence may come in for the relevant nonhearsay purpose (subject to exclusion under Rule 5-403). A limiting instruction should be given upon request (Rule 5-105).
See Graves v. State, 334 Md. 30 (1994) (reversible error to admit arrestee's hearsay statement to police that defendant was his accomplice, for nonhearsay purpose of showing why police included defendant's picture in photographic array to be shown to victim: limited probative value for that purpose was substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice).
Sanders v. State, 194 Md. App. 162, 179-87 (2010) (no abuse of discretion in excluding fact that defendant made a post-Miranda statement to police when offered by defense for nonhearsay purpose, as it "likely would have confused the jury and caused it to speculate why the statement was not introduced into evidence"), vacated on other grounds, 418 Md. 368 (2011).
C. Frequently Recurring Categories of Nonhearsay When an OCS is Relevant
Short of Proving TOMA
1.
Sometimes the mere fact that the OCS was made is relevant, regardless of whether the declarant was either sincere or accurate. In this event, a person testifying to the OCS can be fully cross-examined as to whether the OCS was made as s/he has testified.
a. Verbal acts (a/k/a "legally operative facts"): either the substantive law regarding the particular type of claim or defense requires that an outof-court statement have been made, e.g., defamation, contracts (including the offer and the acceptance), wills, or gives a particular legal effect to that type of statement (e.g., "Your money or your life!").
These utterances are "magic words" under the substantive law; they take the speaker to a particular legal destination. (3)).
D. Evidence Offered for a Nonhearsay Purpose is Not Subject to the Confrontation Clause
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004) ("The Clause…does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted."); Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409 (1985) (defendant's rights under the confrontation clause were not violated by the introduction of the confession of an accomplice for the nonhearsay purpose of rebutting respondent's testimony that his own confession was coercively derived from the accomplice's statement).
Chart 4 THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE: IS THE HEARSAY "TESTIMONIAL?"
Text of U.S. Constitution amend. VI: An accused has the right to confront "the witness" against him or her. In pari materia: Md. Decl. of Rights art. 21.
I. HEARSAY IS TESTIMONIAL (AND THUS SUBJECT TO THE RIGHT TO CONFRONT) IF IT IS:
A. U.S. Supreme Court Cases
(1) Ex parte testimony at a preliminary hearing; or In Crawford, the testimonial statements were made during a "structured, recorded" interrogation at the police station, when the declarant and her husband were suspected of having committed an assault.
Crawford focused on the historical context of the 6 th Amendment: antipathy toward "Bloody Mary's" government's gathering of formal solemn ex parte statements to be used in criminal prosecution.
(6) Police "interrogations solely directed at establishing the facts of a past crime, in order to identify (or provide evidence to convict), the perpetrator. The product of such interrogations, whether reduced to a writing signed by the declarant or embedded in the memory (and perhaps notes) of the interrogating officer, is testimonial." The Davis/Hammon Court looked at the "primary motive" (viewed "objectively") of the police/police agent, in asking the particular questions: was it to resolve an ongoing emergency (yielding nontestimonial statements) or to help to prove past criminal conduct/agency "some time after the events described were over" (yielding testimonial statements)? and (2) the relative degree of solemnity and formality of the interrogation. Both of these factors were held to be relevant to what an objective declarant would take to be the primary purpose of his or her statements.
Dictum: "volunteered testimony" in absence of interrogation would still be testimonial. 
B. Maryland Cases
Statements To or By Agents of Police (9) Statements of 8 and 10-year-old children in an interview by a social worker working in tandem with and in presence of police officers, when child abuse had been reported and the children had already accused defendant to the police. Snowden v. State, 385 Md. 641 (2005) (Harrell, J.) (adopting test of "whether the statements were made under circumstances that would lead an objective declarant reasonably to believe that the statements would be available for use later at trial").
(10) Nontestifying co-defendant's written and taped statements to police at the police station.
Codefendant had made a "miscellaneous agreement" functionally equivalent to a guilty plea agreement, that would become effective after defendant's jury trial (unless the codefendant made a successful motion for acquittal). Because the codefendant had waived his right to actively participate in the trial, the trial court should have treated his confession under Crawford, rather than simply under Bruton. J. Harrell, joined by J. Battaglia, concurred as to the testimony based on the 2002 DNA analysis, but dissented as to the expert's testimony relying on the 1985 serological results, which they found to be merely "raw data" and different in several significant ways from the certificates in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming. 
II. HEARSAY IS NONTESTIMONIAL (AND THUS NOT REACHED BY THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE) IF IT IS:
A. U.S. Supreme Court Cases
(1) Business records (generally) (see Rule 5-803(b)(6)); or (2) "Casual remarks to an acquaintance" or overheard, off-the-cuff remarks; or (5) 911 call where a declarant reasonably would conclude that operator, as agent of police, "objectively" had "primary purpose" "to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency."
N.b. The Confrontation Clause will not exclude, even if testimonial HS:
(1) The accused's own statement, or another's adopted by the accused (see Rule 5-803(a)(1)- (2) Majority opinion by J. Sotomayor held that whether statements are testimonial is determined by a multi-factor analysis, and the presence or absence of one factor is not dispositive.
The factors include: (1) whether there seemed to be an ongoing emergency; (2) the degree of formality of the interrogation; and (3) an objective evaluation of the questions posed and answers given under all the circumstances in which the declarant made the statements at issue.
As to factor (1), she noted that a deadly weapon had been used; the medical condition of the victim (who here asked several times when medical help would arrive), and that the "zone of potential victims" was broader than in a domestic violence case. Seemingly veering away from Crawford's historical reasoning and back toward that of Ohio v. Roberts' focus on reliability, J. Sotomayor wrote: "implicit in Davis is the idea that because the prospect of fabrication in statements given for the primary purpose of resolving that emergency is presumed significantly diminished, the Confrontation Clause does not require such statements to be subject to the crucible of crossexamination."
B. Maryland Cases
Statements to Police and Their Agents (12) 911 call reporting license tag numbers and color of car in which shooter had just fled after leaving carry-out where shooting occurred; caller noted that she was not summoning the police: they were already on the way).
Langley v. State, 421 Md. 560 (2011) (4 to 3 decision) (Harrell, J.) (majority relied on Bryant; C.J. Bell and JJ. Greene and Eldridge dissented).
(13) Several excited utterances made by declarant while pacing back and forth, to responding police officer's questions; declarant had himself been stabbed, while trying to prevent flight of assailant who had fatally stabbed declarant's friend at a crowded tavern. When officer arrived, both victims were bleeding, and assailant's whereabouts were unknown. Officer called for medical assistance twice, and testified it took the police about 30 minutes to secure the tavern and make sure the suspect was not still there. Weapon was a knife. Not a domestic violence case.
"Viewed objectively, the total circumstances…make clear that 'the primary purpose' of the officer's questioning…was to meet an ongoing emergency." Brock v. State, __Md. App__ , 2012 WL 400439 (Feb. 9, 2012 
Chart 5 DID THE ACCUSED "FORFEIT" HIS OR HER CONFRONTATION RIGHT?
No;forfeiture. No: no forfeiture.
Yes Yes
No: no forfeiture.
Yes
The Defendant has lost the right to confront the Declarant and cannot complain about the admission of the Declarant's testimonial OCS's.
Chart 6 HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS AND RELATED ISSUES
A. OCS'S Within OCS's : Rule 5-805
When evidence contains OCS's by more than one declarant, each OCS must be evaluated. If there is more than one "level" of evidence, i.e., we are asked to rely on one OCS to prove another OCS made earlier, then we can't get to the earlier OCS unless the more recent one is admissible (either as nonhearsay or hearsay falling within a hearsay exception 
N.b:
The hearsay may be proved by the testimony of someone other than the declarant, as long as the prerequisites of the Rule are met.
1. Rule 5-802.1(a): A subcategory of a testifying witness's prior inconsistent statements ("Nance statements").
The required foundation:
a. The witness-declarant must testify at trial and be subject to cross-examination concerning the statement; and b. If this requirement is met, then Rule 5-802.1(a) permits substantive use of a witness's prior inconsistent statements if they are either:
(1) written and signed; or (2) stenographically or electronically recorded; or (3) made under oath at deposition, trial, or in a hearing or another proceeding, including a grand jury proceeding. Changes made:
1. The statute applies to child victims under the age of 13 at the time of the OCS, rather than only under 12. 3. In a criminal proceeding or in a juvenile proceeding other than a CINA proceeding, the child victim must testify at the proceeding.
4. The prosecution must give pretrial notice not only of the State's intention to introduce the child's out-of-court statement, but also must provide to the defense any audio or visual record of the statement or, if there is no such recording, the content of the statement.
5. In making its determination as to the admissibility of the child's statement, the court may find that a recording of the statement makes it unnecessary for the judge to examine the child victim.
C. Rule 5-803: Hearsay Exceptions Applicable Regardless Whether the Declarant is Available or Unavailable to Testify at Trial, and Regardless Whether the Declarant Testifies or Not
These OCS's may be proved by the declarant's own testimony to his or her OCS or by the testimony of any other witness having first-hand knowledge of the OCS. v. Shim, 418 Md. 37, 56-59 (2011) (Adkins, J.) (error to have given "flight" instruction to jury when evidence showed only that defendant left scene of crime and took various steps to avoid being apprehended: these steps did not amount to "flight"). Hannah v. State, 420 Md. 339 (2011) (Murphy, J.) held that the trial court had committed reversible error in permitting the prosecutor to admit on cross-examination, after the alleged shooter-defendant had testified that he had no access to handguns and had never held one, the defendant's drawing of a gun and ten rap lyrics he had written about guns and shootings.
Song Lyrics:
The appellate court distinguished inadmissible works of fiction from possibly admissible autobiographical statements of historical fact. It found that the evidence in this case lacked the special relevance needed to make it admissible under Rule 5-404(b), and amounted to mere propensity evidence as to violence. Finally, the door had not been opened by defendant's direct examination. (ii) State's plea agreement with a witness that the witness would testify truthfully did not make that witness's actual testimony at trial of a likely codefendant admissible as an adoptive admission by the State in the subsequent trial of the defendant. Defense was permitted to call witness, but not to prove plea agreement. Armstead v. State, 195 Md. App. 599 (2010 ) (Kenney, J.), cert. denied, 418 Md. 191 (2011 .
(iii)Tacit Admissions (by Silence: A person's silence in the face of another's statement can be interpreted as asquiescence in the truth of (adoption by silence of) the other's statement when three conditions are met:
(1)The party-opponent (or party's agent, etc.) heard the other's statement;
(2)The circumstances allowed for the party-opponent (or agent, etc.) to reply; and (3)Under the circumstances, ordinarily a person similarly situated who was in disagreement would "speak up" and correct the speaker.
These preliminary facts regarding tacit admission (and other adoptive admissions also addressed by Rule 5-803(a)(2)) fall under Rule 5-104(b). If a reasonable jury could find them to be met, the judge should admit the evidence (subject to Rule 5-403).
2.
Rule 5 b. Rule 5-803(b)(2), Excited utterances: a bigger window, as long as the declarant was still so upset by the event that s/he was not thinking before speaking, so as to be able to fabricate a self-serving statement. (iii) Only the facts related in the OCS that are reasonably pertinent to medical treatment or diagnosis in contemplation of treatment will be properly admissible.
Query:
Can the identification of the person who causes injuries ever be pertinent to medical treatment and thus admissible under 5-803(b)(4)?
Yes, e.g., to identify poison given;, and thus the proper antidote. ____, 2012 WL 400439 (Feb. 9, 2012 ) (D. Eyler, J.) (trial court properly excluded unavailable declarant's OCS-recanting prior statements identifying defendant to police--when offered by defense for TOMA; finding also that defense barely preserved the issue of whether the OCS was admissible to impeach the declarant under Rule 5-806, the court held that exclusion of the OCS was harmless error, in light of the other evidence in the case, where the OCS offered by State did not directly identify defendant).
D. Hearsay Exceptions Applicable Only When the Declarant is Shown, under
Rule 5-804(a), to be Unavailable to Testify
1.
Rule 5-804(b)(1), Prior testimony now offered against a party who had an opportunity and similar motive to examine the declarant at the earlier proceeding.
In Williams v. State, 416 Md. 670 (2010) (Raker, J.), the State had violated its discovery obligation under Rule 4-263(d), when it had not disclosed impeaching information known to a police officer that came to light after the first trial: that a key eye witness had said she was "legally blind." The eyewitness died before the retrial.
The second trial judge admitted the witness's videotaped testimony along with medical records about her vision and the detective's testimony that she had told him she was legally blind. The Court of Appeals' majority found these steps an inadequate substitute for the ability to cross-examine the eyewitness. It concluded that: "On remand, if the State wishes to introduce portions of the previously recorded testimony, the trial court should redact any portion which relates to what Longus v State, 416 Md. 433 (2010) (Greene, J.) (violation of defendant's Sixth Amendment right to public trial was reversible error; State's proffer of witness intimidation was inadequate to support exclusion from courtroom of two spectators, when there was neither specific showing that they had threatened the witness nor a voir dire of the witness, and the defense was not given an opportunity to respond to State's proffer) (note that, although J. Greene authored the plurality opinion, four judges and thus the court's majority -J. Harrell, concurring in part and dissenting in part, and J. Murphy, joined by J. Battaglia and J. Adkins, applied the "substantial reason" test for justification of partial closure rather than the "overriding interest' test applied by J. Greene).
Safety and Anonymity of Jurors
By a Rules Order effective September 1, 2011, the Court of Appeals adopted new rules permitting a trial judge, who determines that juror safety or possible harassment or tampering is a concern, to protect the identity of jurors by having them referred to only by number rather than by name. Md. Rule 4-312(c) .
F. Authentication of Internet and Cell Phone Evidence
1.
Social Media
Griffin v. State, 419 Md. 343 (2011) (Battaglia, J.) (finding inadequate authentication of MySpace profile and posting as coming from defendant's girlfriend despite circumstantial evidence). JJ. Harrell and Murphy dissented.
E-Mails, I-M's, and Text Messages
Dictum in Griffin v. State, 419 Md. 343, 361 n. 13 (2011) ("We further note that authentication concerns attendant to e-mails, instant messaging correspondence, and text messages differ significantly from those involving a MySpace profile and posting printout, because such correspondences [sic] is sent directly from one party to an intended recipient or recipients, rather than published for all to see.").
